A Theodicy Brad Johnson _________________________________________________________________ Author Photo Brad Johnson is a Teaching / Research Assistant in the Theology and Philosophy Departments of Cincinnati Bible College & Seminary. Much of his research revolves around inter-religious dialog, philosophical apologetics, and the interplay of Christology upon both. He can be reached through electronic mail at BAJ75@aol.com The author examines the classical understanding theodicy, with emphasis on the relationship between the defender and that which is defended. He examines the Logical and Evidental Problems of Evil, as well as the classical resolutions to such problems. He posits the problem of evil as an existential "pastoral" problem whose answer lies in faith in the person and work of Christ. _________________________________________________________________ And pray to God to have mercy upon us And I pray that I may forget These matters that with myself I too much discuss Too much explain - T.S. Eliot Popularized in Leibniz's essay on evil, a theodicy must be approached with humility. Its combined roots, theos and dike, roughly mean "to justify / defend God." More to the point, however, it is an examination and defense, of sorts, of God's good, creative, and responsible character in the face of doubts caused by evil in the world. In light of these parameters, anyone remaining insincere, pompous, or unbroken by suffering is either blind, at best, or simply a fool. Who is the Defender? Two preliminary questions are key in understanding the nature and underlying purpose of a theodicy. First, who is the defender? The skeptic may seek for answers, per se, but since it is nigh impossible to approach an issue entirely impartially it seems reasonable to conclude that a skeptic does not, at least at first, attempt to defend the character of God. Indeed, a theodicy is only properly done by a defender with a relationship or belief in the God who is defended. For the sake of personal identification, the defender in this particular case holds to the basic tenets of Christianity, or as C.S. Lewis coined it, "mere Christianity." What is Defended? The second question is a theological necessity: Who, or what, is defended? The range of possible answers fall anywhere between God and the defender's own faith. The rationale for this writer's position will become abundantly clear further down, but for now let it simply be asserted that the defender's own faith in God is the focus of his defense. The distinction is definitely subtle, some would argue "nit-picky," but the nature of God Himself, per the argument below, absolves Him of needing a personal defender. This understanding requires the defender recognize the inherent bias within his endeavor. As mentioned above, no one approaches any such matter free of bias; even more, his bias affects anything he experiences, proves, or concludes. Psychologists call this phenomenon cognitive dissonance. In other words, when a person is confronted by an idea, fact, or observation that is contrary to a strong pre-existing notion of reality, his natural reaction is to distort, or perhaps block, the contrary idea, fact, or observation. When disturbing information creates this cognitive dissonance, the information is, in a sense, discredited, so that a person does not feel that he must deal with it, despite its validity. In fact, if an idea is threatening enough it can be prevented from entering one's consciousness entirely. All this is said simply to make a few simple points. Because God does not necessarily need's Man's justification, a theodicy is Man's attempt at reconciling his belief and faith in God with the existence of widespread evil. Second, while this defense can be for both pastoral and polemic purposes, it is only as persuasive -- in either case -- as one's ability to recognize its inherent individual bias. Defining Evil Another preliminary issue to consider is the definition of evil itself. Classically, a distinction has been drawn between natural and moral evil; unfortunately, however, real life rarely divides into neat antiseptic categories. World hunger is but one example. On one hand, it is natural in that it usually entails famine or some other insufficient natural food source. On the other hand, though, it is moral because much, if not all, of world hunger could be alleviated if the world's resources were divided differently. This writer takes the similar position to that of the man asked how he knows something is pornography, "I'm not sure can define it. But I'll know it when I see it." Evil is evil. This is as simple a statement as there is, but important because many theodicies focus entirely on moral evil. It is best, in my mind, to acknowledge evil as it is in real life, free from tidy categories. Evil is the face of Hitler shadowing millions of dead Jewish bodies. Evil is the heightened creativity of child-killers, as each seemingly tries to out do the other in ferocity. Evil is a mother cradling a bloated, limp child to her breast in one last meaningless, desperate measure of hope. Evil simply is. Granted, these examples are the "big" examples of life, but in a theodicy one's faith and understanding of God's character must somehow be reconciled with meaningless (an intentionally subjective term) suffering. Often such suffering is observed: "How could God let Sharon suffer through cancer like she has?" Depending on one's relationship or perception of the sufferer, the degree of God's culpability will vary with different theodicies. It is when, though, one enters into the suffering personally that the theodicy becomes most desperate and, yes, perhaps most necessary. The Problem The problem of evil, as it is popularly called, can be divided into two subsets: (a) the logical problem, and (b) the evidential problem. This theodicy will attempt to deal with both problems, as well as faithfully representing God as presented in Scripture, particularly in the book of Job and in the person of Christ. The logical form of the problem concerns the consistency between the following two statements: (1) God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and omnibenevolent (2) Evil exists Logical inconsistency between two statements is of the following nature: (3) The ball is blue (4) The ball is not colored The skeptic relies on the reasoning that (1) and (2) are explicitly contradictory, in the way that adding (5) Everything that is blue is colored makes (3) and (4) explicitly contradictory. The skeptic must then add a third statement to (1) and (2) for it to be explicitly contradictory. Such a statement, however, must be a necessarily true statement. For example, (5) is necessarily true because it is logically impossible for something to be both blue and non-colored. One attempt is to add (6) An omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and omnibenevolent being will prevent all evil. Herein, (1) and (6) taken together would definitively state, "No evil exists," but (2) remains, "Evil exists." Hence, there is an explicit contradiction. However, is (6) necessarily true? To ascertain its truth, a brief comment concerning God's attributes -- omnipotence, omnibenevolence, omniscience / omnipresence, respectively -- is apropos. Omnipotency Scripture presents Yawheh as an omnipotent, all-powerful being. There is little in the way of actually defining the "extent" - if such a word can rightfully used! - of His power, but passages such as Psalm 8, 29, 115:3ff, 135:6f, and Job 38-42 vividly detail what He can do, has done, is doing, and will continue to do. In His two speeches to a humbled and repentant Job, God repeatedly asks, "Where were you when I . . . ?" and "Do you understand . . .?" Passages such as these find God with undescribable power and, hence, authority over His creation. There are three possible understandings of God's omnipotency, however. It can be defined as (a) His ability to do absolutely anything, (b) His ability to do anything that is logically possible, or (c) His ability to do anything that is logically possible and is consistent with who He is. The problem with the first understanding is the gross contradictions that arise, both within the realm of common sensibility and coherence within God Himself. For example, (a) would suggest that because God is omnipotent, he is able to make a married bachelor, or a square circle. C.S. Lewis referred to this as a "meaningless combination of words" that, in the mind of the adherent, suddenly have meaning simply because he prefaces them with "God can." Furthermore, (a) has the potential to wreck havoc with the coherence and unity of God's attributes as a whole. For example, the age-old question, "Can God make a rock so big that even He can't move?" Answering "yes" or "no" to this question will, regardless, undermine His omnipotence. For if there exists a stone too heavy for Him to lift then He is not omnipotent; but if He does have the power to create such a rock, he has the power to bring it about that he lacks an attribute (omnipotence) that is inherent to His being. With this in mind, (b) is not so much wrong as it simply does not go far enough in its definition. Therefore, it seems to reason that (c) is the most reasonable understanding of omnipotence. Omnibenevolence God's omnibenevolence refers to His perfect moral goodness. In all things, He makes the right choice; He does the right thing in regard to all his other attributes. Does this mean that there is a moral standard outside of God by which we measure God Himself? Or perhaps, it simply refers to His very nature? Plato recognized problems in each. The first suggestion implies something outside the realm of God's control; even more, morality is ordained by God because He sees it is good to live by. The second, though, implies that whatever God commands is morally good. Thus, if God rearrange the 10 Commandments, removing the "not" from those containing it and adding it to those without it, the resultant command would be morally good. I am reticent to go along with the typical answer to this dilemma, that is, our knowledge of what is right (moral) is dependant on God, although this morality may be independent of His commands. My reluctance springs from a holistic view of God, particularly his omniscience in this case (an attribute which will be discussed below). A more reasonable understanding seems to be that God is good by nature and, coupled with his knowledge of Himself and all possible alternatives, knows and ordains what is best for His creation. Omniscience & Omnipresence Omniscience and omnipresence are two attributes that tie together closely in relation to God's nature. They are perhaps the most perplexing and controversial attributes. Does God's omniscience imply fatalism? That is, does the fact that He knows "A" force "A" to happen. In conjunction with the previous question, does God's omnipresence imply that He is present now in "B" while also present in the future "C"? In other words, does God's transcendence of our understanding of measured time mean that he is outside the Time itself? For sake of time and space, a theological and philosophical defense will be curtailed in favor of a few qualified assertions. First, William Lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga have made great strides in convincingly arguing that omniscience does not imply fatalism. God's knowledge of "A" does not force "A" to happen; rather, God's knowledge of "A" is dependent upon his foreknowledge that "A" simply will happen. Plantinga goes much deeper into modal logic than I am comfortable with, but the gist of his point is well made. Second, in conjunction with the first question, Craig has also defended the idea that God thinks and acts in real time, that is, the A-series of temporal moments we are living now. His time, however, is an ontological time that coincides with cosmic time. Therefore, the only now that truly exists, both ontologically and cosmically, is the present now. God is, then, present in only in "B" because "C" does not exist yet. God knows "C," then, because of his omniscience, not omnipresence. The Holistic Answer to the Logical Problem Therefore, is (6) a necessarily true statement? Preventing "the occurrence of all evil" is definitely not logically contradictory with His omnipotence, per se. However, the necessary truth of the statement is hard to ascertain. For example, sometimes evil is sometimes connected with good in such a way that we cannot achieve something good without allowing something evil. In other words, it is logically consistent that if the good outweighs the evil, a good being must permit evil in order to realize such good. This possibility, however, must be logically necessary in order for it to be adequate because of God's omnipotence. In other words, it must be argued that bringing about certain goods without allowing certain evils that are connected to them is as impossible as a square circle. Therefore, in his omnipotence God could stop those evils, but it would be at the loss of those goods as well. None of this necessarily shows how God works, but simply shows that (1), (2), and (6) are not explicitly contradictory because we do not know (6) to be necessarily true. The resulting necessary true addition (7) An omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent God prevents the occurrence of any evil that is not logically necessary for the occurrence of a good which outweighs it does not create a contradiction in (1) and (2), but simply says that existing evil is logically necessary for the good that outweighs it. The Evidential Problem The evidential problem looks past the fact that there is no logical inconsistency with the existence of God and evil but asserts that the amount of evil in our world provides rational support that He does not exist. The problem goes as follows: (8) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby preventing the occurrence of any greater good. (9) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby preventing the occurrence of some greater good. THEREFORE (10) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being. In effect, the evidential problem primarily questions the omniscience and omnibenevolence of God. (8) is not a statement that is proven but a conviction based upon prior experience and perspective. The atheist, in other words, has no problem accepting its veracity, while a theist most definitely does. G.E. Moore has developed the most succinct counter-argument to the evidential problem. Shifting the arguments, his argument contends (not-10) There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. (9) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby preventing the occurrence of some greater good. THEREFORE (not-8) It is not the case that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby preventing the occurrence of any greater good. In effect, this argument first contends that the theist has rational grounds for believing in the existence of God, accepts (9) as true, and thus concludes that (not-8) follows from (not-10) and (9). But once again, however, this argument is only as good as the assumption brought to the table, so to speak. Limits of the Free Will Argument Thus far, the brunt of this theodicy has simply explored the logical consistency of God's existence and the presence of evil. It has been demonstrated that there is no logical inconsistency between His existence and evil; furthermore, an experience and a belief that are either stronger or weaker than (8) determines one's acceptance or denial of (10). Nothing has been said, however, about why evil exists or why God allows it. The answer lies, first, in man's free will, and, ultimately, in the very attributes of God discussed above. The classical Free Will argument asserts that (11) God, although omnipotent, cannot create a world in which there are free human creatures and no evil. In essence, the Free Will argument makes the bold assertions that (1) and (2) are, indeed, consistent. The argument follows that for there to be freedom to choose between choices a and b, the two choices must be different. For any sort of free volition to do good to exist there must also exist the free volition to do evil; hence, good and evil exist. The objection remains, however, why does God do nothing to at least limit the amount of evil? The questions revolving around the Free Will Argument are valid. Indeed, they are questions that it, standing alone, cannot answer. The foundation of the answer to the problem of evil, then, lies in God Himself. As mentioned earlier, God does not need a defense for Himself because He is His own defense. If we simply assume the attributes we ascribe to God, then the answer to the two questions above are answered because we know He has made, is making, and will make the best choice and do the best thing in light of his goodness, knowledge, and power. Even more, per Pascal's Wager, the risk of denying this sovereignty and being wrong is far greater than the risk of having faith and being wrong; conversely, the reward of denying this sovereignty and being right is far less than the reward of having faith and being right. While Pascal's Wager is not the only reason to have faith in God, it is sufficient cause to reflect upon one's reasons to believe or disbelieve. Alvin Plantinga points out there is no way for the skeptic to assert with certainty that, given all the possible worlds God could have created, He did not create the one with the least amount of evil in comparison with the most amount of good. This may be hard to belief considering the evil that one sees, but it is a possibility that is even more persuasive in light of the coherence and unity within the being of God. More than anything else, though, as Job learned from with the voice in the whirlwind, God is working far outside the realm of our understanding. His power, his knowledge, his goodness, and his reach extend beyond Man's comprehension. When one thinks of His omnipresence and omniscience, that is, not just his ability, but his inherent action of seeing and knowing everything that is knowable, the Job-like response, "I dare not speak," should not be far from one's lips. Christological Response to Evil Not only does God know what is best and do what is best, he DID what is best in Christ. Man will continue to look for the answer to the problem of evil, and yet the answer has come and is alive today in the heart of the faithful. The apostles declared in Acts, "The day of the Lord has come," a declaration not lost on the apostle Paul as he details the present victory Christ has won. The faithful in Christ, as John points out in Revelation, are often the most wounded and scarred, but they are the victors nevertheless. John Hick argues that a future vindication is the answer to the problem of evil, but he does not go far enough. It is not just a future vindication of God. On the contrary, the answer lies in the present victory that is dimly seen. Hebrews 2:8 speaks of the present subjugation of Creation at the foot of Christ: "In putting everything under him, God left nothing that is not subject to him. Yet at the present we do not see everything subject to him. But we see Jesus . . . ." As a son of God, the faithful in Christ have won. Conclusion This particular theodicy does not seek to answer conclusively if, or how, God manipulates and controls every action; however, I am more disposed to believe that consequences generally lead to consequences because of the free choice of Man. He chose to create a world of freedom, first, because his perfect will wanted it that way; second, his perfect knowledge knew it was best ontologically, and best for the existential love and adoration He desires to offer and receive. It has been suggested that some evil that befalls Man is an effect of God's refining fire. In other words He is the potter that molds us in His image, but such molding can only occur when Man is broken. This theodicy likes this imagery, to a point. Man often asks the question "why," but either ignores, or perhaps is blind, to the notion that the best answer lies in his response to the world God created. God has allowed the potential for evil in this free world of choice. He has, indeed, limited Himself by creation, as any Man could freely choose to live a life without faith. Perhaps, though, God's perfect knowledge knew that there would remain some like Noah and Job. Men virtually alone in the sea of life's discontent, worry, and sorrow, but men with humble and repentant hearts. Maybe he knew that there would always be women who have been bloodied by the blows of life and nature, and yet committed to the perfect knowledge, power, and will of the God who was, who is, and who is to come. The answer to the problem of evil lies within the God willing to suffer. This answer resides on the bank where two rivers converge to meet at a Cross. This answer is found in the response of Man to both love and pain. The victors, after all, are often the bloodiest. - Printer-Friendly Version - See Related Resources _________________________________________________________________ copyright © 1995-1999 Leadership U. All rights reserved. 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